Summary
The isolation condenser system (ICS) is part of the emergency core cooling system in five U.S. boiling-water reactors. In the event that the reactor pressure vessel becomes isolated from the main condenser, the ICS removes decay heat from the reactor. The ICS is important to reactor safety because it is relied on to help mitigate core damage during a loss-of-coolant accident.
In support of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Nuclear Plant Aging Research (NPAR) Program, staff from the Pacific Northwest Laboratory researched the aging of the ICS by reviewing available industry databases. Each component of the ICS was evaluated to 1) identify applicable aging issues and also to 2) determine if the component had already been studied as a part of other NPAR assessments.
The results of this preliminary study indicate that most of the critical ICS components have been previously evaluated by the NPAR program. The one ICS component that has not been specifically studied is the isolation condenser itself. There is little evidence in the databases to suggest that there have been problems with the isolation condenser. Only one plant, Millstone Unit 1, has ever had an isolation condenser tube failure problem recorded. This instance resulted from events that occurred early in the life of the plant. The problem was remedied through tube replacement.
The isolation condenser and the pressurized-water reactor (PWR) steam generator were compared to illustrate that even though the isolation condenser is a heat exchanger, it is not subjected to the same service dynamics as the PWR steam generator. The isolation condenser operates for most of its service life in a relatively benign, static environment, resulting in a comparatively good service record.
PNL staff recommend that the results of this research be used to continue studying the ICS to determine if the aging isolation condenser tubes are being adequately maintained. This new study should include an evaluation of the current inspection methods and a verification that they are effective in identifying tube aging degradation, such as intergranular stress corrosion cracking. Continued study may also provide beneficial input into the design of the Simplified Boiling Water Reactor. 
Acronyms

.O Introduction
In support of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Nuclear Plant Aging Research (NPAR) Program, staff from the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) performed a pre-phase I assessment to identify aging issues for the isolation condenser system (ICS) used in commercial boiling-water reactors (BWRs). The objective of the investigation was to evaluate the ICS and determine if further research is needed to detect and mitigate degradation due to aging mechanisms such as corrosion and mechanical wear.
The ICS is an emergency core cooling system designed to provide emergency cooling to the reactor when the reactor vessel becomes isolated from the turbine and main condenser by closure of the main steam isolation valves. In the event the main condenser is not available as a heat sink, the ICS removes residual and decay heat from the reactor and depressurizes the reactor vessel. Natural circulation provides the driving head for reactor coolant through the isolation condenser tubes. The shell side of the isolation condenser is filled with water that boils off to the atmosphere to remove heat transferred from the reactor. The shell side of the isolation condenser vents to the atmosphere.
Five BWRs in the United States have an ICS and fall within the scope of this report: Oyster Creek, Nine Mile Point 1, Millstone Unit 1, and Dresden 2 and 3. Big Rock Point, an early model BWR, has a component called an emergency condenser that performs a similar function to the ICS. However, because of its unique design, it was not included within the scope of this assessment.
System Description
This section describes the general operation of the ICS at the five plants. There may be unique system variations from plant to plant, but the design bases for the ICS remain the same. Some of the more important plant differences are noted within the text of the system description.
System Operation
The flow path for a typical ICS loop is illustrated in Figure 1 . During standby operation, with the reactor at power, the inboard and outboard (inside and outside of the drywell enclosure) steam supply isolation valves (1 and 2) and the inboard condensate return valve (4) The ICS may be manually initiated, or automatically initiated on high reactor pressure or low reactor water level. Upon system initiation, the outboard condensate return valve (3) opens and the vent valves (5) close. Steam flows from the reactor vessel to the isolation condenser through the steam inlet isolation valves (1 and 2). Steam is condensed in the isolation condenser tube bundles, and the condensed steam is returned to the reactor through the condensate return isolation valves (3 and 4) via the reactor recirculation system. During system operation, the demineralized water in the shell side of the isolation condenser is boiled off and vented outside the reactor building to the atmosphere. The boiled-off water is replaced by the condensate transfer system or the fire water system. Radiation monitors will detect any radioactivity release from the shell side of the isolation condenser. High radiation levels will initiate an alarm in the control room. The alarm warns of a possible tube leak and the potential release of radioactive primary coolant to the environment.
The ICS is designed to automatically isolate itself from the reactor pressure vessel in the event of a system pipe break. This isolation will mitigate the loss of reactor coolant inventory. The pipe break is sensed by monitoring for high flow rates in the steam supply and the condensate return lines. Flow is sensed by measuring the differential pressure across piping elbows in each of the steam supply and condensate return lines. The inboard and outboard steam supply valves, the inboard and outboard condensate return valves, and the vent valves will close if the differential pressure exceeds three times the normal flow value for a short time delay (plant-dependent, approximately 3 to 15 s). 
Critical Component Description
Components that are critical to the initiation, isolation, and safe operation of the ICS were the focus of this aging study. These components consist of the isolation condenser, steam supply valves, condensate return valves, vent valves, system piping, and system instrumentation.
Isolation Condenser
Isolation condensers are horizontal, shell-and-tube heat exchangers with a capacity rating of about 3% reactor power. Each condenser has two sets of stainless steel U-tubes (Millstone Unit 1 has Inconel 600 tubes), one set on each end of the condenser. The tubes are designed to meet the design pressure and temperature conditions of the reactor. The shell of each isolation condenser is constructed out of carbon steel, and its maximum internal pressure is about 1.0 x 1@ Pa (15 psig).
The major differences among the plants that fall within the scope of this report are the number of isolation condensers at each facility. Millstone Unit 1 and Dresden 2 and 3 each have one isolation condenser loop and one isolation condenser per loop. Oyster Creek has two isolation condenser loops with one isolation condenser per loop. Nine Mile Point 1 has two isolation condenser loops and two isolation condensers per loop. The major valves for each loop are the same, i.e., two steam supply and two condensate return isolation valves. The schematic presented as Figure 1 represents any given ICS loop. The exception would be Nine Mile Point 1 where the single isolation condenser would be replaced with two isolation condensers that operate in parallel. Each of the Nine Mile Point 1 isolation condensers has only one stainless steel tube bundle.
Steam Supply and Condensate Return Valves
The steam supply and condensate return valves are typically 25.4-to 35.6-cm (10-to 14-in.) motor-operated gate valves and are rated for reactor design pressures and temperatures. The inboard valves are AC-powered, and the outboard valves are DC-powered. The outboard valves are located in the reactor building and have the capability to be manually operated even during plant operation.
Vent Valves
The vent valves are small bore [1.9 to 2.5 cm (314 to 1 in.)], air-operated valves and are rated for reactor design pressures and temperatures. The operating air is supplied by the instrumentlservice air systems via DC-powered solenoid valves. The vent valves are opened by air pressure and closed by spring pressure. If the vent valves were to fail closed during ICS standby operation, noncondensible gases could build up in the isolation condenser and then be forced into the isolation tube bundle on system initiation. The presence of noncondensibles in the tube bundle inhibits condensation and natural circulation.
Piping
Most piping in the ICS is stainless steel with pipe diameters ranging from 1.3 to 40.6 cm (112 to 16 in.). The piping of critical concern is that which is subjected to reactor operating pressures and temperatures.
Instrumentation
Flow in the ICS steam and condensate lines is measured by differential pressure detectors located in the piping elbows of the steam supply and condensate return lines. The steam supply detector senses flow in the elbow upstream of the inboard isolation valve. The condensate return detector senses flow downstream of the outboard condensate return valve. High flow in any of the lines monitored by these detectors is an indication of a system pipe break, and isolation is required.
System initiation input (low reactor water level and/or high reactor pressure) is supplied by the reactor protection system.
Other instrumentation that is used for system monitoring but has no automatic initiation or isolation input includes the following: condenser shell side level indication: level must be maintained to ensure that the ICS will operate within technical specification parameters condenser shell temperature indication: high temperature indicates condenser tube leakage or condensate return valve leakage area temperature monitoring: high temperature in the area adjacent to the isolation condenser indicates possible system rupture steam line pressure indication: this is for information only; during standby operation this pressure should be the same as reactor pressures shell vent line radiation monitoring: increased radiation levels indicate possible tube leak and potential reactor coolant release.
System Interfaces
The ICS interfaces with a number of other reactor systems: 1) shell makeup water systems, 2) reactor protection systems, 3) reactor recirculation systems, 4) main steam systems, 5) instrument/se~ice air systems, and 6) electrical systems. The following sections describe how each of these systems interface with the ICS.
Shell Makeup Water Systems
The demineralized water system provides initial fill and makeup water to the shell side of the isolation condensers for day-to-day evaporation. For this type of operation, some plants have the capability to automatically supply makeup water to the isolation condenser. Depending on plant design, the demineralized water system may not be capable of acting as a makeup source during isolation condenser operation. Operation of the isolation condensers can continue for about 30 to 90 min before the volume of water stored on the shell side of the isolation condenser will be depleted. This interval allows sufficient time to initiate makeup water flow to the shell side of the condenser via the condensate transfer system or the fire water system. Some drawbacks were identified when using the condensate transfer system or the fire water system for makeup water. The condensate transfer system at some plants is potentially contaminated with relatively low levels of radioactivity. If the condensate transfer system is used during ICS operation, the possibility exists to steam away the contaminated water to areas outside the reactor building. If raw water from the fire system is used during ICS operation, the potential exists to contaminate the isolation condenser internals with chlorides, thereby increasing the prospects for intergranular stress corrosion cracking of isolation condenser stainless steel components.
Even though these drawbacks exist, they are far outweighed by the need of the ICS to mitigate the possibility of core damage due to a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA).
Reactor Protection System
The reactor protection system supplies reactor water level and reactor pressure input to the ICS initiation logic. A failure of the ICS to automatically initiate would require the operators to manually open the outboard condensate return valve.
Reactor Recirculation System
The ICS returns condensate to the reactor via a connection to the suction side of a selected reactor recirculation pump. The Oyster Creek and Nine Mile Point 1 plants each have five recirculation pumps. Each ICS loop returns condensate to a separate pump. The Millstone Unit 1 and Dresden 2 and 3 plants have two recirculation pumps, and the ICS returns condensate to one recirculation pump. The reactor recirculation system is procedurally controlled to maintain an open pathway for the ICS to return condensate to the reactor.
Main Steam System
During standby operations, the ICS vents noncondensible gases downstream of the main steam isolation valves via the ICS vent valves to the main steam system. If the main steam system has failed during reactor operation, the ICS would most likely be in service and the ICS vent valves would be closed.
Instrument/Service Air Systems
The plant instrumentlservice air system supplies air to the operators of the ICS vent valves. A loss of the air system will cause the vent valves to close.
Electrical Systems
The 480 VAC is used to power the inboard steam supply and condensate return valve operators, and 125 VDC is used to operate the outboard steam supply and condensate return valve operators. DC power is also used to power the air pilot solenoids for the ICS vent valves. The loss of electrical power to the steam supply and condensate return valves will cause the valves to fail in the "as-is" position. The loss of power to the air pilot solenoids will cause the vent valves to fail to the closed position.
Safety Significance
The following sections describe the safety significance of ICS in mitigating design basis accidents. Also described is the regulatory guidance that helps determine the importance of the ICS with respect to other reactor systems and components.
Design Bases
The ICS is required to function during a small break LOCA to assist the automatic depressurization system (ADS) in depressurizing the reactor as a backup to the plant high pressure injection systems. Using the ICS during a LOCA condition serves two functions: 1) it minimizes the loss of reactor water inventory to the torus, which normally occurs during ADS blow down, and 2) it allows earlier initiation of low pressure injection systems.
~ndividual Plant Evaluation
The ICS plays a key role in mitigating core damage during a severe accident. Assuming that each of the five plants has the same general design, the ICS should have the same relative importance from plant to plant. To explain the importance of the ICS, the Millstone Unit 1 IPE was used as an example. The IPE states that the isolation condenser, which can operate independently of AC power, is a key system that can prevent core damage for several hours in a station blackout sequence, which increases the likelihood of recovering AC power prior to core damage (Northeast Utilities Service Company 1992, p. 7-1). One-third of the core melt frequency is due to sequences including a loss of normal power as an initiating event, the failure of the diesel and gas turbine generators, the failure to manually initiate the isolation condenser prior to safety relief valves (SRVs) lifting, and an SRV sticking open. In this scenario, no credit is taken for recovery of AC power because of the assumed short time to core uncovery. The lack. of an AC-independent high pressure injection system, such as high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) or reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC), contributes to the vulnerability of Millstone Unit 1 to this scenario (Northeast Utilities Service Company 1992, p. 7-2).
Regulatory Guidance
The NRC has developed regulatory guides that designate the relative importance of systems and components to ensure their adequacy, availability, and capability to perform their intended functions. The ICS falls within the scope of the monitoring program defined by the Maintenance Rule 10 CFR 50.65 because it meets the definition of a safety-related system. The ICS is defined as a safetyrelated system because it is relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events to ensure 1) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, 2) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, and 3) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite exposure.
Methodology
The operating history of the ICS was explored to identify the aging-related issues associated with the system. The search was conducted by accessing the available industry databases, which consisted of the nuclear plant reliability database system (NPRDS), nuclear power experience (NPE), RECALL'") database, and literature searches at the Hanford Technical Library. These searches yielded maintenance records, license event reports (LERs), and NRC information notices. NPRDS was the primary source of aging degradation information for individual components and is the primary focus in this report. The RECALL database, NPE, and the literature searches performed at the Hanford Technical Library were valuable sources for the descriptions of plant events (LERs and NRC information notices) that involved ICS malfunctions. Most of the malfunctions could be traced back to the component failures in NPRDS.
(a) Commercially available to PNL.
Results and Evaluation
The NPRDS search was performed by staff at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The search was on the key words: "isolation condenser." Approximately 250 maintenance records were found on file. The records were divided into separate components and, for the purposes of this report, were further subdivided into three general categories: electrical, instrumentation, and mechanical. These records describe the component that failed and the cause of the failure. From this infornlation, it could be ascertained whether or not the failure was aging-related. Also, as part of the research methodology, each ICS component was evaluated to determine if it had been included as part of a previous aging assessment under the NPAR program. The following summarizes the findings from the NPRDS search.
Electrical
The electrical category divides into two sub-categories, circuit breakers and relays for a total of 15 records. NPRDS shows nine failures of breakers for ICS valve operators and six records of failures of time-delay relays. Although there is evidence of aging in these components, circuit breakers and relays have been studied in a separate NPAR task (Gleason 1992) .
Instrumentation
There were 134 records found that referred to failures of ICS instrumentation. Of these, 113 records referred to instrumentation of primary concern that includes inputs into initiation and isolation logics. These instruments included differential pressure switches and pressure transmitters. The remaining records listed failures of instruments used to monitor temperature, radiation, and condenser shell level.
About 100 records indicated set-point drift and instrument repeatability as the failure mode. In a number of cases, repeatability of the instrument was either not adequate for system design or the operating band was larger than the technical specification tolerance. In these cases, the system was upgraded to meet the technical specifications requirements.
Set-point drift is discussed in NUREG/CR-5700, Aging Assessment of Reactor Instrumentation and Protection System Components (Gehl and Hagan 1992, pp. 58-59) :
Instrumentation and control systems in nuclear plants are typically provided with adjustable set points where specific actions are initiated. Each of these adjustable set points is assigned a preset value. Set-point drift is the unplanned change in these preset values. When the change is of sufficient magnitude to cause the set point to fall outside specified limits, the event may be classified as an abnormal occurrence that must be reported to NRC.
A 1977 report (Basin et al. 1977 ) credited set-point drift problems as being "influenced by the initial selection of the instruments, their range, application, calibration, operation, and maintenance procedures. " Aging was not considered as a factor in either that report or a 1974 report (Hartfield 1974 ).
The term "drift" is often used erroneously as a synonym for the term "aging related." Set-point drift is sometimes erroneously considered an indication of an aging-related problem.. Although modules with aging-related problems may be more likely to have excessive drift problems, set-point drift does not reliably indicate that an aging-related problem exists. Set-point drift is affected by the module's design, application, calibration, and maintenance and operation procedures as well as aging-related problems.
In light of the aging research on reactor instrumentation documented in NUREGICR-5700 (Gehl and Hagen 1992) and the fact the ICS instrumentation does not operate in any unique environments, further study of ICS instrumentation is not required.
Mechanical
The mechanical general category includes pipe, supports, and valves. A total of 102 records address failures in these areas and ten of these records reported failure in ICS piping. All the failures were related to intergranular stress corrosion cracking in weld heat affected zones. Most of the cracks were found during in-service inspections. Aging research has been performed for BWR piping (Shah and MacDonald 1993) . Because the ICS is exposed to the same environment (e.g., reactor coolant chemistry) as discussed in Shah and MacDonald, further research on ICS piping is not required.
Thirty-one records describe failure of the ICS pipe snubbers. Of these, 13 records indicated that the snubbers were incorrectly installed and 18 records noted some type of aging concern. Most of the records that noted aging stated that the snubbers were easily replaced, and the operation of the ICS was not affected. PNL completed Phase I1 aging research of snubbers in 1991 (Brown et al. 1992 ). Snubbers are not within the scope of this report.
Sixty-one records discuss failures of ICS valves and valve operators. The most frequent valve failures were due to packing leaks. Packing leaks do not necessarily affect the operation of the critical ICS valves that are required for system initiation and isolation. These valves are motor operated. ICS valves fall within the scope of an aging study on motor-operator valves, NUREGICR-4234 (Haynes 1989) . Thermal binding was also a cause of valve degradation and accelerated aging. Procedures are in place in the affected plants to cycle the valves during plant cool down to mitigate this problem.
Isolation Condensers
The isolation condenser does not appear to fall within the scope of any other NPAR research. Moyers (1992) does address the aging of heat exchangers, but only water-to-water heat exchangers.
The isolation condenser's primary and secondary media go through a phase change during ICS operation. This type of heat exchanger is not addressed in Moyers (1992) .
Prior to the investigation of isolation condenser aging, it was expected that problems might be found with the tubes in the isolation condensers. This expectation was based on the tube failure problems found in PWR steam generators. However, only one plant had recorded problems with isolation condenser tube failure.
In February 1976, Millstone Unit 1 experienced a reactor scram from 100% power because of a turbine generator trip. The subsequent pressure spike, caused by the turbine control valves closing, ruptured a tube in the isolation condenser. A follow-up investigation revealed that the stainless steel tube showed evidence of cracking characteristic of chloride-assisted, stress corrosion cracking that initiated from the inside of the tube. The corrosive species is believed to have been introduced into the condenser tubes several years prior to the event when the plant had an incident involving the injection of seawater into the isolation condenser. The plant operators re-tubed the condenser with Inconel 600 tubes (NPE 1976 and General Electric 1976) .
As a result of this incident, the NRC issued Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin 76-01 (Appendix A). Among other things, the NRC required that licensees ensure that the integrity of the isolation condenser tubes was being maintained during plant operation. Tube integrity is confirmed by implementing tube leak detection procedures that call for monitoring the shell-side water temperature, volume, and isotopic content. If any of these parameters increases, a tube leak is suspected. The NRC also required that the licensees ensure that the margin of isolation condenser tube integrity is maintained by periodic nondestructive examinations of the tubes. Where nondestructive examination can not be performed, hydrostatic testing is an acceptable alternative. From the available information, four plants directly referenced procedures to hydrostatically test and/or to test the heat removal capability of the isolation condenser on a 5-year cycle.
The paucity of isolation condenser tube failures as compared with the significant problems that PWR reactor steam generators have experienced with tube degradation and failure can be understood in terms of key differences in thernlal and flow conditions, secondary side chemistry, and materials.
Steam generators are in constant operation when the reactor is at power. The secondary side of the tube bundle is subjected to a phase change of the secondary coolant from liquid to steam, which requires a flow through the tube bundle and its tube supports. Corrosion of the tube support members restricts secondary flow through the tube bundle and will ultimately "dent" the tube and also restrict the flow of primary coolant through the tube. Many of the tube failures occur where the tube intersects the tube supports, at the high stress areas of the tube U-bends, and at the tube sheet. Steam generator tubes are periodically subjected to nondestructive testing and inspection. Tubes that show indication of imminent failure are plugged or replaced.
The isolation condensers, in contrast to the PWR steam generators, are in a standby condition and will be for most of their operating life. The tube bundles are constantly submerged in demineralized water [< 93°C (< 200°F) ]. In addition, the shell side of the isolation condenser is continuously vented to atmosphere. The primary side of the tube bundles is exposed to reactor coolant that is "dead legged" against the condensate return valve. The steam supply to the isolation condenser vents noncondensibles upstream of the tube bundles.
The isolation condenser, therefore, is not exposed to the same dynamics as a steam generator. This lack of exposure is apparently the reason that the isolation condensers have not evidenced the same degree of aging degradation.
